Excerpt from:

The numerous choices that Robert E. Lee faced following the first day's fighting at Gettysburg are among the most intriguing in the Gettysburg epic. Each of these choices are examined in detail within the pages of the mammoth study, Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the Gettysburg Campaign, authored by veteran historical author Scott Bowden and Bill Ward. The following excerpt is from the sub-section entitled "Lee Considers His Options for July 2," found in Chapter VI. In this narrative, Bowden and Ward look at one of the five options that was open to General Lee for July 2, 1863. This option, which remains today as one of the most controversial aspects of Gettysburg, was Longstreet's proposal to "move by the right flank"-a course of action that was advocated by Longstreet to General Lee following the combat of 1 July. Please remember as you read, that the positions of the opposing armies at the end of the fighting on July 1 was generally on an east-west facing. Therefore, Longstreet's "move by the right flank" would have the Confederates, then facing eastward, moving south while the Federals faced westward. This excerpt describes the third of five options that Lee had to have considered.

Since maneuvering to the left offered only limited benefits fraught with great risks, there was another choice of maneuver that Lee might have selected. This other maneuver option, the third choice that Lee could have made-to maneuver the army to the right, or towards the south, as Longstreet proposed-has received so much attention in Gettysburg literature, that a detailed examination of this possible course of action is not only appropriate, but warranted. In military history, it seems as though a story, if repeated often enough by a legion of writers, becomes an excepted truism. Once this occurs, a tale so often repeated acquires a life of its own and becomes part of the popular culture whereby its acceptance is no longer questioned, much less critically evaluated. Arguably, one such story in American military literature is Longstreet's proposal to march the Southern army from where it was on the evening of July 1 around to the right, or south, and position it between Meade's forces that were concentrating at Gettysburg, and the Federal capital at Washington. What would have been the possibilities of the Army of Northern Virginia pulling off this maneuver, and what would have been the advantages to undertaking this course of action? On the other hand, what would have been the difficulties in embarking on such a march, and what would have been the disadvantages of moving the Confederate army to the south and/or east? Furthermore, what was the understanding of operational warfare by the man who proposed the move-or, in other words, what had Longstreet demonstrated before Gettysburg that warrants the apparent, unquestioning acceptance of his proposal by many historians and students of the battle alike as being a good idea? Over the years, Longstreet's proposal has almost become an unquestioned statement as to what the Confederate army should have done after July 1. Was the proposal by Longstreet and its subsequent near-universal repeating by many of those interested in the battle a realistic and valid alternative for the Confederate army following the fighting on July 1? As with all the possible courses of action open to Lee, the crux of the argument of moving around by the right must be examined in light of information that existed at that time.

The first two things to be examined are interwoven, which are: whether or not Longstreet's proposal to move by the right was possible, and if so, what would have been the difficulties in pulling it off. In other words, could Lee's army have simply started marching westward and southward on July 2, then redirected their march in order to swing around the Federal forces, and then somewhere further to the south and east taken up a position that would have compelled Meade, in Longstreet's view, to rashly hurl his troops against the ready and waiting Confederates? Based on the position of the Southern army at the time of Longstreet's proposal, there existed no good road network that could be used by the Confederates to bypass the Federal forces along Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge without imposing significant delays by first detouring westward. There was, of course, the Emmitsburg Road that ran south from Gettysburg along the front of Meade's troops along Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge. However, Lee knew that Federal troops had been moving up the Emmitsburg Road during July 1, and that Buford's cavalry had fallen back to a position covering the road south of the Sherfy Peach Orchard. Perhaps Lee recalled Napoleon's Military Maxim that stated: "Nothing is so rash or so contrary to principle, as to make a flank march before an army in position, especially when this army occupies heights at the foot of which you are forced to defile." Whether Lee remembered this reading or not, he had to have been struck by the fact that the best way to move by the right was to take the Emmitsburg Road, and it was commanded by the muzzles of Meade's guns as well as already serving as an avenue for Federal troops moving towards Gettysburg. To move south across country out of range of Meade's ordnance before eventually filing back onto the Emmitsburg Road, or to use the Hagerstown (or Fairfield) Road to withdraw to the southwest before turning south or east, Lee recognized that he would be virtually blind in committing his army on this course of action owing to the continued absence Stuart. How could any commanding general order his army to disengage from the enemy and then embark on such a maneuver without the benefit of an adequate cavalry screen? Since Lee already knew that Federal troops had been moving up the Emmitsburg Road during the day of July 1, when, he had to have asked himself, might more Federal corps using that route be arriving, especially since he could surmise that the entire enemy army was not in his front? And if the Federals were on the move towards Gettysburg using a number of possible roads, wouldn't the numerous Federal cavalry be able to screen their approach whereas the Confederates had no such luxury? The most experienced regiments of Southern horse-those cavalrymen who were expert in scouting and outpost duties as well as in combat-that could be used for screening were off riding with the man in the plumed hat. Instead, there was only Albert Jenkins' Brigade numbering about 1,600 raiders then with the Army of Northern Virginia in the Gettysburg vicinity, to which must be added the 200 men of White's 35th Virginia Battalion. This meant that there were only 1,800 irregular Confederate horsemen available to attempt screening any maneuvers when it was already known by Lee that the Federals had a minimum of two or more brigades of regular cavalry were already present with the other Federal troops concentrating around Gettysburg. If Lee chose this course of action without withdrawing along the Hagerstown Road to Fairfield before then heading south, he would have had to pull out from Gettysburg and redirect the army southward across small, overland trails that would have slowed the march rate of the army to a crawl, especially when the infantry would have to be used to provide protection for the elongated logistical tail of the army, and would be hoping that Meade would not respond or challenge such a move. From the positions on top of Cemetery Hill that offered clear and unobstructed views north and westward, and from the observation point on Little Round Top, there is little doubt that Meade and his officers could have mistaken what the Confederates were up to if Lee's forces, especially Ewell's Second Corps then located north of town, suddenly began withdrawing and moving off either to the southwest or to the south. Lee fully appreciated the Federals' over-anxiety for the safety of Washington, and had to have reasoned that such a flanking movement, when attempted across the face of his adversary, would prompt the swiftest possible reaction. In fact, once Hancock had finished reorganizing the Federal forces south of town on July 1, he then scouted and positioned the Federal line while recognizing that it could be turned from the south. He reported this by messenger to Meade, who was still at Taneytown. Meade evidently agreed and even feared such a move, for he ordered his chief of staff, Major General Daniel Butterfield, to issue preliminary withdrawal orders early in the morning hours of July 2. Meade's concern for his left may have, in part, been attributed to Henry Wager Halleck, Lincoln's general-in-chief and an ardent student of the Napoleonic wars as theorized by Baron Henri Jomini, repeatedly warned Meade about the possibility of Lee slipping by the Federal army's left flank. While it is usually true that what an enemy fears is a sound course of action, Halleck's and Meade's anxiety about a Confederate move around the Federal left flank might have been significantly lessened had they known the crippling effects of "Jeb" Stuart's absence from Lee's army. Nevertheless, Federal fears of another Confederate maneuver had, no doubt, been heightened by the Chancellorsville debacle during which the flanking march by Jackson's Southerners had been misinterpreted as a retreat by several West Point officers following the capture of the 23rd Georgia by Berdan's 1st U. S. Sharpshooters. With the humiliation of Chancellorsville still freshly impressed upon the minds of the senior officers of the Army of the Potomac when the hated rebels had marched 15 miles to get on their flank, then formed double line of battle along a two-mile front before viciously attacking through the thick woods of The Wilderness, it does not take a vivid imagination to ascertain what would have been the reaction of Meade, Hancock and others at Gettysburg if Lee's army, without the benefit of "Jeb" Stuart's screening cavalry, would have attempted to disengage and move off on another flanking march. Given the mind-set and the anxieties of the Northern generals, it is implausible that General Meade would have simply sat and watched this happen.

However, Meade could not have known the debilitating effects that the continued absence of Stuart had on Confederate designs to conduct a flanking march to the south, although he might have received some scouting information from Buford about the constricting road network that Lee would have been forced to use in moving his army cross country. One only has to read Lafayette McLaws' narrative of the difficulties he encountered in moving his division from the Hagerstown Road southward to Pitzer's Schoolhouse that was west of lower Seminary Ridge in preparation for his attack on July 2 to get an rough idea of the difficulty that would have entailed in moving the entire Confederate army across country in order to get around the right of Meade's forces. That is why once the Southern forces had been seen moving south, it is difficult to imagine an officer as competent as Meade not employing Buford's cavalry as a blocking or delaying force while the Federal infantry could have utilized the Emmitsburg Road to move faster than could the Southerners marching along another route cross country in the same direction. Therefore, it is easy to see that Meade would have had a better road network and cavalry superiority in order to respond to the threat and intercept the Confederate flank march. An additional point is that Meade could have redirected additional Federal corps, like the Sixth, to reroute their own march to Gettysburg and detour in order to link up with the other Federal troops moving down from Gettysburg. Perhaps the single most salient point that advocates of the 'move to the right' have never dealt with is what Meade and the Federal army would have been doing while Lee was making this move. Those who subscribe to the theory that Robert E. Lee could have marched his army across the face of Meade's forces without the benefit of adequate numbers of screening cavalry when the Federals had most of theirs and then executed the maneuver without the Federal commander responding in competent fashion by shifting troops to meet the Confederate threat, are, in effect, arguing that George Gordon Meade lacked the brain power to recognize what the Confederates would have been doing and the ability to respond in a responsible way, and would have simply sat there in a stupefied fashion and watched the Confederate army move to the south! Such an assumption can only imply that either the Confederates would have got such a jump on the Federals that the Army of the Potomac could not have prevented or compromised such a march, or that Meade was a blundering fool. It is clear from what was already known at Federal headquarters, that any Confederate flanking movement to the south would have been dealt with swiftly, while there is nothing to suggest that Meade was incompetent, or would have acted incompetently, which are the pillars on which the 'move to the right' theory rest. What's more, for Lee to undertake such a flanking movement to the right would have had the effect of stringing out the Southern army even more than it was on July 1. And that meant that the Confederate forces would have been more vulnerable than ever, thereby placing Lee's valuable logistical support at a much greater risk than it already was on July 1 when the Southerners were moving towards their foe. To move around the right on July 2 would be to march across the enemy's front, and Lee knew that Napoleon's Maxims still applied to any army which moved according to the speed of horse and foot. And as important as some maxims might be, there were other, established principles of war would have been violated if Lee moved his army to the right. By doing so, the Confederates would have had to abandon their lines of communication, which for Lee meant that his lines of resupply would no longer exist. Even more important is that by moving to the right, Lee would have lost the protection of South Mountain and the Cumberland Valley that already served as his line of retreat. Therefore, if Lee would have agreed to move to the right on July 2, he would have placed his army in a position by where they no longer had a protected line of communication, resupply and retreat. Since Lee was previously aware that Federal forces were in the vicinity of Frederick and Harpers Ferry, and without available troops to act as garrisons along any line of communication, by moving to the right, Lee would have had absolutely no way of securing or protecting his rear areas. "An army ought only to have one line of operation," Napoleon wrote. "This should be preserved with care, and never abandoned but in the last extremity." What Napoleon knew was also apparent to Lee as it was to the noted military writer Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz, who stated in his On War the following: "Roads that lead from an army's position back to the main sources of [supply] have two purposes. In the first instance they are lines of communication serving to maintain an army, and in the second they are lines of retreat."

With all the problematic factors associated with moving to the right, what would have been the advantages to the Confederates had Lee chosen that course of action and had been able to get between Meade and Washington? Would those advantages have outweighed the litany of negatives that the Confederates would have had to overcome? While the Federals were very sensitive about the safety of Washington, there appear to be almost no realistic advantages if Lee's forces could have slipped between Meade and the capital. Why? Because whatever the supposed advantages that the proponents of 'move to the right' argue exist, exist only on the assumption that Meade would have had no option other than to play into Southern hands by first acting indolent, followed by altering his behavior by rashly and immediately attacking once the Southerners were in position. What's more, the theory of moving to the right assumes, of course, that the Confederates could have pulled off the maneuver to the south and settled into a defensive position of their choosing. It also assumes that Meade would not have subsequently maneuvered, or have been able to maneuver to force the Confederates out of such a defensive position. The Federals probably knew that Lee's army did not possess a pontoon train north of the Potomac, and Meade no doubt would have calculated a plan of maneuver to take advantage of that Confederate weakness. In conclusion, proponents of the 'move to the right' assume that the Confederates could have made an unmolested march, found a strong defensive position, and once those conditions had been fulfilled, Meade, in Burnsidian fashion, would have simply impaled his forces upon the ready-and-waiting Confederate army. Therefore, it is this supposed behavior by Meade that totally impeaches the argument of the proponents of the moving to the right proposal. For Longstreet and all those since who have advocated the move to the right, assume that General Meade would have acted in a manner which completely conforms to their designs in order to fit whichever part of the theoretical plan was being executed.

Lee was aware what many historians and students of the battle fail to realize: while a theoretical maneuver such as the 'move to the right' might appear desirable if conducted as a sandtable exercise where no real outside influences come into play, in reality the 'move to the right' was very unattractive and highly dangerous course of action for all the reasons that have already been detailed, and would place the one victorious and principal army of the Confederacy in extreme peril without corresponding benefits to accompany such a gamble. While Lee certainly had great faith and trust in Longstreet as a corps commander, it is equally true that up until this time, Longstreet had yet to exhibit the traits of being a successful executive officer-one who could not only operate independently, but also could develop and undertake successful operational plans. Longstreet's proposition to move to the right certainly did not impress Colonel Armistead Lindsay Long, the military secretary to General Lee. Long wrote: "From the nature of the country, the absence of [our] cavalry and the proximity of an uncrippled enemy, the flank movement referred to [by Longstreet] was simply an absurdity." In short, prior to this time, Longstreet's successes had always occurred on the tactical level while carrying out Lee's plans or directives, and not as a result of his own operational plans or concepts. Longstreet, in advocating the move to the right and establishing a defensive position seemed to present a plan to fight a battle which would offer conditions appropriate to his special talents of fighting on the defensive. The shortcomings of Longstreet's plan are that they simply failed to take into consideration the campaign conditions as they actually existed.

In the end, despite the popular lore now attached to it, the proposed 'move to the right' violated every principle of war that applied at that time and had absolutely no grounding in the realities of the existing military situation. As such, it was arguably the worst possible choice Lee could have selected. Fortunately for him and his magnificent army, Lee did not follow the well-meaning but ill-founded advice by the commander of his First Corps. end of excerpt from Chapter VI.----