Bill Ward teaches at the University of Texas-Arlington, as well as in the Tarrant County College and Dallas Community College systems. He specializes in military and international conflict and has pursued a life-long interest in the American Civil War. In addition to his undergraduate work at the University of Texas (Austin), he received his Masters at UT-Arlington and is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Oklahoma.

Authors’ Interview

Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and the GettysburgCampaign

A Critical Examination of Southern Leadership in the Pivotal Campaign of 1863

by Scott Bowden and Bill Ward


Interview by Ted Savas, publisher, with authors Scott Bowden and Bill Ward—

Savas: With so much written about Gettysburg, what contribution does Last Chance for Victory offer?

Bowden & Ward: As one of the pivotal events in American military history, most people already with a working knowledge of the War Between the States feel that they understand Gettysburg. Unfortunately, the basis of this understanding is quite often rooted in the myth and misinformation that surround this epic. At the center of many of these myths are the decisions and orders given by Robert E. Lee. Our book, Last Chance for Victory: Robert E. Lee and Gettysburg, is a critical examination of Southern leadership in the pivotal campaign of 1863, with the focus, obviously, being on the Confederate commanding general. As such, the work’s most significant contribution is the analysis of General Lee’s decisions, orders and resulting generalship within the context that they occurred.

Savas: You say that there is a lot of myth and misinformation surrounding Gettysburg. What do you mean?

Bowden & Ward: The myths connected with Lee and other central characters—both Confederate and Federal—and the resulting misinformation that surrounds these people, is the major focus of the work. To cite just two examples examined in Last Chance for Victory, consider the following:

1) many people believe that “Jeb” Stuart had the latitude to act in the manner that he did during the campaign. A careful reading and analysis of the various letters of instructions to Stuart, the scouting by John Mosby of the proposed route of march for Stuart, the placement of the various Federal corps prior to Stuart’s departure on June 25, and Stuart’s own actions at Haymarket, all of these and more clearly reveal, when considered in their totality, that the issue of the so-called “discretionary orders” to Stuart have absolutely no basis in fact; and

2) another, and possible more visible myth, is James Longstreet’s proposal to ‘move by the right’ following the battle on 1 July. This idea is dealt with extensively in Last Chance for Victory, as are all the options Lee had to consider for his army on July 2, 1863, and it is Longstreet’s proposal that was undoubtedly the worst choice Lee could have made.

Savas: For your book to say that Longstreet’s proposal was the worst possible course of action Lee could have undertaken seems to fly in the face of what many writers have advocated what Lee should have done. How does Last Chance for Victory deal with this?

Bowden & Ward: The short answer is: extensively, clearly and decisively! We invite the reader to refer to the excerpt from Chapter VI that deals, in part, with this issue, and is included on this web site.

Savas: You mentioned that the work is a detailed analysis of Southern leadership, which includes Lee’s decisions. How did you develop this analysis?

Bowden & Ward: The analysis was developed in three ways. First, there is a story that is told that is extensively researched and documented. Second, many of the myths and misinterpretations advanced concerning Lee and Southern leaders are extensively analyzed against the backdrop of eye-witness testimony, letters, reports and much, much more. Third, the comments of Robert E. Lee about the battle are analyzed as to their meaning. For example, Lee’s famous statement about the fighting on July 2nd, “Half an hour longer and we would have carried the enemy’s position,” has never been fully examined. What did Lee mean by this, and what were the factors involved that give crystal clarity to the meaning of this statement? Last Chance for Victory accomplishes this in what we hope is an entertaining and thought-provoking manner.

Savas: Someone just picking up the book can see that it is a massive work. Was such detail necessary?

Bowden & Ward: Absolutely. The issues of going north in the summer of 1863, Lee’s understanding of warfare and his style of generalship, the debate surrounding Stuart, why Lee concentrated the army when and where he did, the controversy surrounding the failure of Confederate pursuit on first day’s fighting, the numerous and complex issues at play on the second day, as noted by Lee recognizing the changing circumstances and modifying the mode of attack, and why Lee continued the battle on the third day, all required extensive research and analysis. Additionally, in our concluding chapter, we bring all these issue together in order to lay out the reasons why Lee failed at Gettysburg. There is no doubt, that many of the conclusions have never been fully examined before now.

Savas: You said something that caught my attention about Lee modifying the Confederate mode of attack on July 2. How?

Bowden & Ward: This is another of those many issues surrounded by myth and misinterpretation that is covered at length in the book. To put it briefly, Last Chance for Victory, through the narrative, accompanying maps, illustrations and art work, brings to life a General Lee who recognizes that circumstances had changed significantly from what he had been told that morning. Being on the scene, Lee changes the plan of attack to the en échelon mode in order to take advantage of the enemy’s deployments and his own troops and commanders’ capabilities. The reasons for Lee changing the attack mode, and what it was to accomplish, has never before been fully developed. Last Chance for Victory corrects this fault. In doing so, the work challenges the conventional wisdom that General Lee did not perform well on July 2, 1863.

Savas: If you argue that Lee performed well on July 2, how do you believe he did on the other days?

Bowden & Ward: From his decision to shift the strategic defense of Richmond out of Virginia and into Pennsylvania, up until July 3, Lee did very well and illustrated the qualities of the Great Captain that he was. The major fault we find with Lee in this campaign occurs on what became the final day of the battle.

Savas: What was Lee’s failing on July 3?

Bowden & Ward: Contrary to popular opinion, we find that it was not his decision to continue the battle by attacking again. Rather, Lee’s failure was on a different level. With all that was riding on the outcome of the battle, the South needed her very best soldier directing the operations, and that soldier was Robert E. Lee and not James Longstreet. Through Lee’s interaction with Longstreet that morning, the commanding general should have clearly recognized that Longstreet, with his unrealistic ‘flank march and reverse attack” plan, was not mentally prepared to direct the plan of battle that Lee had previously ordered. Also, the issue of why Lee did not take direct tactical command of the attack on July 3 is fully examined.

Savas: If there is one theme—and one theme only—that you want Last Chance for Victory to be known for, what is it?

Bowden & Ward: It is our hope that every reader will recognize the fusion that is Last Chance for Victory, that fusion being entertainment, new ideas and interpretations that are well- reasoned, and thought-provoking conclusions on numerous, controversial topics, and as such, something that the reader may constantly refer to for study and enjoyment.