More has been written about Gettysburg than any other battle in American military history. Tens of hundreds of books and articles have been printed on the subject. Even bits and pieces of the fighting have received book-length treatment. For example, a large monograph appeared recently covering in minute detail the fighting for Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill; another and even larger volume by the same author examined the fighting on the southern end of the field on July 2. Even the skirmishing around the Bliss Farm, a small complex of buildings improbably situated between two low ridges that would feel the tramp of thousands of feet marching in one of the greatest infantry assaults in American history, has received lengthy attention.

We were thus not surprised when students of the War for Southern Independence reacted, at least initially, with some skepticism to the news that we were intending to add to this deluge of ink. "Do we really need another book about Gettysburg and Pickett's Charge?" they often asked. The short answer to that question is yes, another book is necessary. And the following paragraphs explain why.

Many generations have passed since the great armies clashed in southern Pennsylvania and almost 50,000 men in blue and gray were killed, wounded or captured in a supreme display of conviction and courage on both sides. Efforts to interpret exactly what had happened and why began almost immediately. Men in the ranks discussed the great events comprising the three days in July; letters found their way home praising heroic efforts and lamenting lost opportunities. And the seeds of discord-spread initially in whispered conversation and obliquely hinted at in battle reports-were sown for later generations to harvest. Murmurs of misconduct (and worse) commenced after the fighting stopped, but after General Lee dies in 1870, Southern mischief makes like Jubal Early and William Nelson Pendleton kicked their slander and libel efforts into high gear. Many of their fabrications, printed in one form or another and delivered in speeches across succeeding generations, have braided themselves into the original fabric of the battle. Variations of their vitriol have emerged as accepted reality. Other mistakes, some great and others less so, have been repeated so often that they are now looked upon as gospel. Modern historians, steeped in Gettysburg "tradition," have continued perpetrating these accepted "facts" of the battle without subjecting them to the cold and often unforgiving light of logic, reason, and objectivity. Consequently, significant misunderstandings exist and continue to be perpetuated about the generalship of Robert E. Lee during the invasion of Pennsylvania.

Many writers and students of what is today popularly referred as the American Civil War believe that Gettysburg was the nadir of Lee's career; his performance in Adams County during the first three days of July 1863, so the belief goes, evidenced an overly combative and headstrong general who could not stem his impulse to throw his men away by the thousands in frontal attacks against George Meade's Army of the Potomac. Lee, it is often said, issued "discretionary" orders to key subordinates at critical moments-and lost control of his army; once engaged, the ailing commanding general displayed a "passive" command style while asking of his men the impossible. James Longstreet, tradition holds, ran roughshod over Lee, who allowed his First Corps leader to drag his recalcitrant heels in the Pennsylvania dirt as the hours ticked by on July 2 that could have been better used crushing the enemy's left flank. Conventional belief maintains that Lee's decisions doomed his legions to defeat. So accepting of this tale are most people that the aforementioned is simply assumed to be true.

But is any of this really true? What are the facts-repeat, facts-behind these assertions? Did Jeb Stuart have the authority to conduct a raid as the Confederate army moved north, and how did his absence affect the campaign? How does Lee's generalship look when his decisions are judged within their proper historical context? What was Lee trying to accomplish in Pennsylvania? What was his vision for victory? What were his goals on July 1? July 2? July 3? How did Lee modify his plans to take into account the changing circumstances of battle? How did his key corps, division and brigade subordinates perform?

The Gettysburg Campaign was a complex series of events and is now a celebrated part of our national heritage. Indeed, Lee's decision to go north and his generalship at that famous battle are but reflections of the complexities of mid-19th century America and the country's road to war. That is why the 1863 summer invasion campaign that culminated with the Army of Northern Virginia's defeat on northern soil was as complex in its reasons for it taking place as were the whys that Lee conducted the battle the way he did as were the reasons for the failure of the democratic processes which led to war as a solution. Questioning the core dogma of Gettysburg will be seen as heresy by many. But repeating stories that have no basis in fact because others continue to assert them as true is not good history, and does nothing to further the study of the campaign or honor the brave men who waged it. To illustrate this point, consider the popular criticism many writers often heap upon Lee for committing the Army of Northern Virginia to the offensive on the second day at Gettysburg, After flaying him for his rashness, Lee is further condemned for the manner in which he attacked late on the afternoon of July 2, when (so tradition largely holds) Longstreet dripped his men into action in what these writers see as a piecemeal and largely frontal attack against Meade's southern flank. As readers of Last Chance for Victory will discover, Lee had very good reasons for renewing the offensive that day, considerations rarely if ever seen in print. In fact, resuming the offensive was in accord with every sound military principle of the age and displayed in Lee a moral courage commensurate to the monumental task at hand. Lee also carefully modified his original plan of attack that afternoon from a more standard flanking assault into an en échelon attack to take advantage of the changed tactical dispositions of his enemy. And we demonstrate conclusively that, contrary to popular belief, it was George Gordon Meade who was piec emealing his army towards destruction on the afternoon of July 2, 1863-not Robert E. Lee.

But none of what transpired in Pennsylvania can ever be fully understood or appreciated unless the events that spawned the campaign are carefully considered. Accordingly, we explore fully the strategic and political state of the Confederacy in the weeks leading up to the Pennsylvania invasion and the decisions and options President Jefferson Davis and Lee faced in May 1863. This examination includes an evaluation of President Davis" important (and often overlooked) role in shaping the composition of the Southern army that forded the Potomac River in the middle of June 1863. Davis" policies impacted the campaign far more than most people believe.

Because all men are but reflections of their upbringing, education, and experiences, we also expend considerable effort scrutinizing both the man and the general who led the Army of Northern Virginia northward that summer. Robert E. Lee was trained as an engineer at West Point, studied extensively the campaigns of the Great Captains of military history, and learned the art of command and maneuver at the elbow of General Winfield Scott during the Mexican War. The aggregate of these experiences had a profound and demonstrable influence on his generalship. It is against this backdrop of education and experience, along with the immutable principles of war, that Lee's decisions during the Gettysburg Campaign must be examined, understood, and judged.

Our approach and method of presentation is also radically different from traditional fare. For example, the complex series of decisions, movements, and fighting on July 2 are always-always-broken apart and tendered to readers in separate chunks. The fighting around Devil's Den and Little Round Top are often handled in one chapter, the fighting around the Rose Woods and Wheatfield in another, the combat at the Peach Orchard salient handled in another section, attacks by Anderson's Division upon Cemetery Ridge and Early's brigades storming up Cemetery Hill in yet more chapters, and so on. The consequence of this customary method of presentation compartmentalizes these phases of the July 2 engagement into mini-battles comprising separate actions. And that is how most students of Gettysburg have come to view them. But they were not unrelated sequestered endeavors. Rather, they were part of one overall interlocking plan of attack that came much closer to breaking apart and decisively defeating Meade's army than anyone heretofore has fully explained. Thus, Chapter 7-all 137 pages of it-is presented as a single fluid event so that readers may fully comprehend what Lee intended to accomplish with his echelon attack, how the attack was progressing, where it broke down, and who was responsible-and just how close Lee came to realizing his bid for victory on Northern soil.

Most modern military studies lump strings of sources together, which makes it difficult for readers to locate an original quote or source relied upon by the author. We have employed a more traditional note methodology and have endeavored to identify each source as it used within each respective sentence and paragraph. We are extremely grateful to the publisher for agreeing to accommodate us in this regard.

Many chapters conclude with a recapitulation of their primary events, decisions, and results. While this inevitably leads to some redundancy, we believe it is both helpful and worthwhile-especially since several of the chapters are quite lengthy. Further, each summation includes commentary refuting assertions made by other prominent historians on several major issues of import. Our intent is nothing more than an attempt to correct the historical record, and we hope readers understand, appreciate and enjoy our efforts in that light.

Finally, it should be obvious to anyone who has read this fat that Last Chance for Victory is a critical examination of General Lee and Southern leadership during the campaign. Therefore, it does not examine equally the role played by General Meade and his top subordinates; that task we leave to others.

Acknowledgments

Naturally, no work of this magnitude could have been fully realized without the kind assistance of others too numerous to mention. However, we would like to take this opportunity to offer our gratitude to several individuals and institutions who went above and beyond the call of duty. We are greatly indebted to the Dean and staff of the Harold B. Simpson History Complex at Hill College, Hillsboro, Texas, who oversee the valuable Confederate Research Center. Dr. Buddy D. Patterson, Dean, was always accessible, and he embodies what we consider to be the finest traits of a true Southern gentleman. As the research center's Director, Peggy Fox fielded from us what must have seemed to be a never-ending barrage of questions about source material, and when she was not available, Sandra Rich was always gracious with her time and assistance. At the Library of Congress, we were ably assisted by Mary Isom, who saved us much time and trouble, while the staff of the Museum of the Confederacy always treated us with courtesy and handled our requests on a timely basis. We appreciate the comments from Earl Upchurch and Lynn Totten, who read and commented on early versions of the manuscript. In taking the effort to read and make recommendations on a later version of the manuscript, we also appreciate the expertise of Matt DeLaMater, who was kind enough to help us obtain many valuable documents from different institutions of higher learning. Also of notable help were the efforts of Jesse Lewis, who secured some of the documents from the Library of Congress. Thanks also to Larry Slayton, Peter W. Orlebeke, and Fred Stovall for their time in reading and commenting about various aspects of Southern military operations. Mark Cichock also provided notable assistance. We are further indebted to Charles Tarbox who, during our many trips to Gettysburg, was always willing when asked to walk the ground and talk about many terrain and artillery related aspects of the battle. Few people know more about artillery and Gettysburg than Charlie. We also appreciate the efforts of Timothy H. Smith, who provided insight and answers concerning different structures in Gettysburg. James Kralik, a licensed battlefield guide at Gettysburg, extended considerable time during our visits to that sacred field.

Additional thanks are due Dale and Anne Gallon of Gallon Historical Art in Gettysburg. The inclusion of Dale's magnificent art certainly helps bring to life the text and the spirit of Last Chance for Victory.

Accomplished cartographer George Skoch ably prepared the maps in record time. His work is excellent and we are grateful for his efforts.

Finally, we wish to thank our publisher and editor, Theodore P. Savas, for his faith in this sizable project. Ted read the manuscript countless times and offered insightful recommendations that in the end made this a much better book. It was a pleasure working with him.